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Abstract
During World War I (1914{1918) the birth rates of countries such as France, Ger-
many, the U.K., Belgium and Italy fell by almost 50%. In France, where the population
was 40 millions in 1914, the decit of births is estimated at 1.4 millions over 4 years
while military losses are estimated at 1.4 millions too. Thus, the fertility decline doubled
the demographic impact of the war. Why did fertility decline so much? The conven-
tional wisdom is that fertility fell below its optimal level because of the absence of men
gone to war. I challenge this view using the case of France. I construct a model of
optimal fertility choice where a household in its childbearing years during the war faces
three shocks: (i) an increased probability that its wife remains alone after the war;
(ii) a partially-compensated loss of its husband's income; and (iii) a decline in labor
productivity. I calibrate the model's parameters to the time series of fertility before the
war and use military casualties and income data to calibrate the shocks representing
the war. The model over-predicts the fertility decline by 10% even though it does not
feature any physical separations of couples. It also over-predicts the increase in fertility
after the war, and generates a temporary increase in the age at birth as observed in the
French data.
Initially circulated under the title \Optimal Fertility During World War I." Thanks to Patrick Festy for
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1 Introduction
The First World War lasted four years, from 1914 to 1918, and ravaged European countries
to an extent that had never been seen until then. During the war, the birth rates of countries
such as France, Germany, Belgium the United Kingdom or Italy declined by about 50% {see
Figure 1. In France, an estimated 1:4 million children were not born because of this decline.
This gure amounts to 3:5% of the total French population in 1914 (40 millions), and is
comparable to the military losses which are estimated at 1:4 million men.1 In short, the
fertility decline doubled the already large demographic impact of the war.
Although the analysis that I present is about France during the First World War, neither
France nor World War I are unique cases. As is clear from Figure 1 other belligerents of
the war experienced the same fate as France. In Germany, for instance, the decit of births
was about 3.2 million, noticeably exceeding the 2 million military casualties. Furthermore,
there is evidence, presented by Caldwell (2004), that fertility declined in many countries
during various episodes of wars, civil wars, revolutions and dictatorships {see Table 1. The
conclusions that I reach in this analysis can be extended, at least qualitatively, to these
episodes.
What prompted fertility to decline by such magnitude during the First World War? The
conventional wisdom is that the main cause of the fertility decline was the absence of men.2
In this paper I challenge this view, and propose an alternative quantitative theory of the
collapse of fertility. I develop a model of fertility choice where a household in its childbearing
years during World War I faces three unanticipated shocks: (i) an increase in the probability
that its wife remains alone after the war; (ii) a partially-compensated loss of its husband's
income because of the mobilization; and (iii) a decline in productivity. I calibrate these
shocks to be consistent with French data and nd that the model predicts a strong decline
in fertility: 10% more pronounced than in the data, even though it does not feature any
physical separations of couples. The model also over-predicts the post-war fertility increase
by 31% and generates, as observed in the data, a temporary rise in the age at birth after
the war, due to the postponement of fertility by generations aected by the war.
The unit of analysis is a nitely-lived household which, at the beginning of age 1, is made of
two adults: a husband and a wife. The household derives utility from consumption as well
1See Huber (1931, p. 413). Military losses include people killed and missing in action. They are a lower
bound on the death toll of the war since they do not include civilian losses.
2See, for example Huber (1931), Vincent (1946) and Festy (1984).
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as from the number of children and adults it comprises. It can give birth to children at age 1
and 2, but children are costly to raise. They require time, goods, and a share of household
consumption for an exogenously given number periods after they are born. A husband
supplies his time inelastically to the market in exchange for a wage, while a wife splits
her time between the market, where she faces a lower wage than a husband, and raising
children. From age 2 onward the number of adults follows one of two possible regimes. In
peacetime it remains constant. During a war there is a positive probability that it decreases
to one, i.e., that the wife remains alone in the household. The war is unanticipated, but
once it breaks out there is a positive probability that it goes on for another period.
In this setup the war aects fertility as follows. First, it raises the marginal cost of a child.
This is because the three shocks associated with the war lead to a reduction of consumption
since, together, they imply a drop in contemporaneous and expected income, as well as an
increase in income risk. The corresponding increase in the marginal utility of consumption
raises the cost of diverting resources away from consumption and toward raising children.
Second, the war reduces the marginal benet of a child. This is because the expected
marginal benet of a child is lower when the expected number of adults in the household
decreases. These two eects yield the decline in fertility during the war. In addition the
war induces an age-1 household to postpone giving birth until later in life. This is because
when the war prompts a household to reduce its fertility at age 1, its stock of children is
abnormally low at the beginning of age 2, hence the marginal utility of a birth at age 2 is
large. This eect is magnied if the war is over once the household reaches age 2. This
mechanism yields the fertility catch-up observed after the war.
I adopt the following quantitative strategy. I calibrate the model's parameters to t the
time series of the French fertility rate from 1800 until the eve of World War I. Specically,
I minimize a distance between actual and computed fertility for generations of households
who entered their fertile years before the war broke out. In this exercise I assume that peace
prevails and that wages grow exogenously at a rate calibrated to be consistent with French
data. I use the time series of fertility because it contains relevant information to discipline
the parameters that determine the eect of the war. This is because to t the downward
trend of fertility in the data, preference parameters must be such that the income eect
of rising wages on fertility is dominated by the substitution eect. Since the war is itself
a combination of contemporaneous and expected income shocks, the discipline imposed by
the time series on the size of the income eect is relevant for assessing the impact of the war.
Using the calibrated parameters I then compute the optimal choices of generations exposed
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to an unanticipated war. To quantify the three shocks implied by the war I use three
statistics. First, I use the military casualties relative to the number of men mobilized to
calibrate the probability that a wife remains alone after the war. Second, I use income data
to calibrate the proportion of uncompensated income loss by mobilized husbands. Third, I
use data on output per worker to calibrate the reduction in wages that occurred during the
war.
This paper contributes to a literature analyzing the consequences of the First World War
on various aspect of the French population. Henry (1966) discusses the consequences of the
war for the marriage market and, more recently, Abramitzky et al. (2011) also study the
marriage market to evaluate the impact of the war on assortative matching. The closest
studies are by Festy (1984) and Caldwell (2004). Festy (1984) oers a detailed description
of the decline of fertility during the war. He concludes that it resulted from households
being unable to achieve their desired fertility because men were physically away, rather
than from a change in the desired level of fertility.3 I challenge this view for three reasons.
First the number of births in the early 1920s in France was above its pre-war level even
though 1.4 million men did not come back from the War. This would not be possible if the
absence of men was the sole reason for the collapse of fertility. Second, 30 to 50 percent of
mobilized men were in the rear, in contact with the civilian population. Third, men at the
front did not stay there for 4 years. Leave policies became more systematic and generous
after the rst year of the war. I develop these points in Section 2. Caldwell (2004) examines
thirteen social crises, ranging from the English Civil War in the 17th century to the fall
of communism. He documents noticeable falls in fertility in each cases, and concludes that
they were mostly temporary adjustments to the uncertainty of the time. His results are
consistent with the analysis that I carry out in this paper.
More generally, this paper is related to an already large literature focusing on the deter-
minants of fertility across countries and over time. Seminal work was done by Barro and
Becker (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989). Other authors have explored various aspects
of fertility choices. Galor and Weil (2000) analyze the \-shaped pattern of fertility over
the long-run. Greenwood et al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom in the United
States. Jones et al. (2008) review alternative theories explaining the negative relation-
ship between income and fertility across countries and over time. Albanesi and Olivetti
3\La chute de la natalite pendant les hostilites peut donc e^tre vue, par dierence, comme une consequence
`mecanique' de l'impossibilite de s'unir pour procreer, pluto^t que comme une volonte deliberee d'eviter d'avoir
des enfants dans une periode aussi troublee." (Festy, 1984, page 1003).
4
(2010) evaluate the eects of technological improvements in maternal health. Jones and
Schoonbroodt (2011) theorize endogenous fertility cycles. Manuelli and Seshadri (2009)
ask why do fertility rates vary so much across countries? And Bar and Leukhina (2010)
investigate, simultaneously, the demographic transition and the industrial revolution. The
paper is also related to the literature investing various consequences of wars and economic
disasters. For instance, Barro (2006), Barro and Ursua (2008) and Barro and Jin (2011)
analyze economic disasters, including wars, and their impact on nancial markets. The
eect of a war on fertility is explored, in the case of World War II and the U.S. baby boom,
by Doepke et al. (2007). Ohanian and McGrattan (2008) is an example where economic
theory is used to investigate the eect of the scal shock that World War II represented for
the U.S. economy. Finally, the paper relates to the literature focusing on the importance
of labor market risk as a determinant of fertility, e.g. Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) and
Sommer (2009).
In the next Section I present statistics relative to the number of births and deaths during
the war as well as to the composition of the Army. I also discuss relevant facts pertaining
to the marriage market and the situation of women during the war. I develop my model
and discuss the determinants of optimal fertility in Section 3. I present the quantitative
analysis and the results in Section 4. In Section 5 I show that the analysis done in the
context of my model carries over to a setup where the quality-quantity tradeo is key for
the determination of fertility. I conclude in Section 6.
2 Facts
Some data are from the French census. The last census before the war was in 1911. The
rst census in the post-war era was in 1921. A census was scheduled in 1916 but was
cancelled. This data, and the data from previous censuses, were systematically organized in
the 1980s and made available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR). It is also available from the French National Institute for Statistics and
Economic Studies (Insee). Vital statistics are available during the war years for the 77
regions (departements) not occupied by the Germans. There was a total of 87 regions in
France at the beginning of the war. Huber (1931) provides a wealth of data on the french
population before, during and after the war. It also contains a useful set of income-related
data.
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2.1 Births and Deaths
The rst month of World War I was August 1914, but the rst severe reduction in the
number of live births occurred nine months later: it dropped from 46,450 in April 1915 to
29,042 in May {a 37% decline.4 During the course of the war the minimum was attained
in November 1915 when 21,047 live births were registered. The pre-war level of births was
reached again in December 1919. To put these numbers in perspective consider Figure 2,
which shows the number of births per month in France and Germany from January 1906
until December 1921, as well as trend lines estimated using pre-war data. For France, the
dierence between the actual number of births and the trend, summed between May 1915
(9 months after the declaration of war) and August 1919 (9 months after the armistice),
yields an estimated 1.4 million children not born. This gure amounts to 3.5% of the
French population in 1914 (40 million) and is comparable to the military losses of the war:
1.4 million. The estimate for Germany is 3.2 million children not born. It amounts to 5%
of the German population in 1911 (65 million) and exceeds the number of military deaths
estimated at 2 million.5 In short, the fertility reduction that occurred during World War I
doubled the demographic impact of the war. Similar calculations, made by demographers,
lead to comparable gures: Vincent (1946, p. 431) reports a decit of 1.6 million French
births and Festy (1984, p. 979) reports 1.4 million.6
The birth rate of Figure 1 and the number of births of Figure 2 measure contemporaneous
changes in fertility. They are silent about the longer-term eect of the war: did the couples
that reduced their fertility during the war only postponed births? To answer this question
Figure 3 shows two standard measures of lifetime fertility, the Total Fertility rate and
completed fertility. Completed fertility is of particular interest since it is a measure of
realized lifetime fertility, namely the number of children born to a woman of a particular
(synthetic) cohort throughout her fertile life. Figure 3 shows that the women who reached
their twenties during the First World War gave birth, throughout their lives, to less children
than the generations that preceded or followed them. Thus, even though there is evidence,
discussed later, that these women postponed their fertility until after the war was over, they
did not fully compensate the forgone births of the war. If they had, their completed fertility
would have remained unaected by the war since one less child today would be made up
4See Bunle (1954, Table XI, p. 309).
5See Huber (1931, pp. 7 and 449).
6Another statistic of interest can be computed with the trend lines of Figure 2. The realized number of
births between May 1915 and August 1919 was 52% of the expected number in France, and 57% in Germany.
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for by one more child later on.
At this stage, it is worth observing on Figure 2 that, early after the war, the number of
births is not only above trend but that it is also higher than its pre-war level. This is true
for both France and Germany and occurred despite the military casualties. If the physical
absence of men was the sole reason for the decline in births at the outset of the war, then
births could not be has high in the immediate aftermath of the war, when fewer men came
back than initially left. Only if fertility behavior changed can Figure 2 be rationalized,
and my analysis is precisely about understanding the eect of the war on optimal fertility
behavior.7
The demographic consequences of the fertility decline in France was large and persistent.
Consider Figure 4 which shows the age and sex structure of the population before the war,
in 1910, and after the war, in 1930, 1950 and 1970. The dierences between the pre- and
post-war population structures are quite noticeable. The rst eects of the war are visible
in the 1930 panel. First, there is a decit of men (relative to women) in the 30-50 age
group. These are the men that fought during World War I and died. Second, there is a
decit of men and women in the teens. This is the generation that should have been born
during the war but was not because of the fertility decline. The 1950 panel shows again the
same phenomenon 20 years later. The men who died at war should have been in the 50-70
age group, and the generation not born during the war should have been in its thirties.
Note also the decit of births that occurred in the early 1940s, that is during World War
II. What caused this? It could have been that, as during World War I, fertility declined.
For the French, however, the impact of World War II was quite dierent than that of World
War I, possibly because the ghting did not last as long. In fact, the birth rate in the 1940s
shows a noticeable increase.8 Thus, births were low in the 1940s because the generation
that was in its childbearing period at that moment, e.g. of age 25 in 1940, was born in and
around World War I. This generation was unusually small, so it gave birth to unusually
little children despite a high birth rate. Thus, the decit of births during World War I lead,
mechanically, to another decit 25 years because of a reduction in the size of the fertile
population. The 1970 panel shows that, as late as in the seventies, the demographic impact
of World War I is still quite noticeable. The generation that should have been born during
7Huber (1931, p. 521) reports a net migration of 330,000 workers between 1919 and 1920, so the decit
of french men was not compensated by an inow of immigrants.
8One can argue that the baby boom was already under way in the early 1940s in France. Greenwood et
al. (2005) propose of theory of the baby boom based on technical progress in the household that is consistent
with this view.
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the war should, by then, have reached its fties.
Figure 5 shows the age and sex structure of the populations of Germany, Belgium, Italy as
well as Europe as a whole and the United States in 1950. All European countries exhibit
a decit of births during the war which, as is the case for France, is still noticeable in the
1950 population. The United States, on the contrary, were not noticeably aected by the
World War I. The United Kingdom appears to have experienced a reduced decit of births
during World War I compared with other European countries. Europe as a whole exhibits
a noticeable decit.
2.2 The Army
The mobilization was massive. A total of 8.5 million men served in the French army over
the course of the war, while the size of the 20-50 male population is estimated at 8.7 million
on January 1st 1914. Thus, almost all men served at some point during the war. In the
model of Section 3 and the experiment of Section 4, I use this observation to justify the
assumption that all men serve when the war breaks out. The vast majority of soldiers
were mobilized, that is they were called to serve and had to report to military centers of
incorporation. Huber (1931, p. 94) reports that a small, albeit not negligible, number of
men (229,000 men) volunteered into the army between 1914 and 1919. Those men choose
to serve even though, at the time they did, they were not compelled to do so by law. On
August 1st 1914, the day of the mobilization, the army counted already 1 million men. The
remaining 7.5 million were incorporated throughout the four years of the war.9 Throughout
the war the army regularly reviewed cases of men exempted from military duty for whatever
reasons, and called large proportions of them to serve.
A commonly proposed explanation for the fertility decline is that soldiers were physically
away and, therefore, unable to have children. The size of the decline in fertility was, in
this view, a reection of the size of the mobilization. Not all the men serving in the army
were sent to the front, though. On July 1st, 1915, there were 5 million men in the army
but 2.3 million of them served in the rear. These men were serving in factories, public
administrations and in the elds to help with the production of food for the troops and the
population.10 Between August 1914 and November 1918, the fraction of men in the army
actually serving in the rear remained between 30 and 50%. The men in the rear were in
9See Huber (1931, p. 89).
10See Huber (1931, p. 105).
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touch with the civilian population and, therefore, were more likely to have the opportunities
to procreate than the men at the front.
The combat troops did not spent all their time at the front either. Leaves were generalized
in June 1915. Starting in October 1916 soldiers at the front were granted 7 days of leave
every 4 months, not including the time needed to travel back to their families. These leaves
could also be augmented at the discretion of one's superior ocer. Later in the war leaves
were increased to 10 days. These leaves augmented the physical opportunities to have
children.
2.3 Women
Figure 6 shows evidence that the women reaching their childbearing years during World
War I postponed their childbearing decisions. This observation is important to understand
the behavior of fertility after the war. Fertility was above trend in the immediate aftermath
of the war in part because the generations that could have given birth during the war did so
after, together with the younger post-war generations. In the model of Section 3 households
are allowed to choose how many children to have in 2 periods of their lives to allow this
mechanism to operate and assess its importance for the post-war recovery of fertility. As
mentioned in Section 2.1, however, this catch-up eect after the war, that is the above-trend
fertility of older generations, was not enough to compensate for the lost births of the war.
This is why the completed fertility of the generations reaching their twenties during the war
was less than that of other generations {see Figure 3.
Henry (1966) shows that the marriage market was noticeably perturbed for the generations
reaching their marriage and childbearing years during World War I. Women born in 1891-
1895 (aged 21 in 1914) either got married before or after the war. After the war the marriage
rate of this generation was abnormally high relative to other generations at the same age: a
sign of \recuperation" of postponed marriages. A similar result holds true for the generation
of women born in 1896-1900. The post-1918 marriages were characterized by a shift in the
age structure of marriages: women married men of their age or younger more than they
usually did, because the men they would have normally married were dead. Interestingly,
Henry (1966) reports that the proportion of single women, at the age of 50, for the 1891-
1895 generation is 12.5%, and that for the 1896-1900 generation it is 11.9%. These gures
compare with similar gures for generations whose marriage decisions were not aected by
the war such as the 1851-1855 generation: 11.2%, or the 1856-1860 generation: 11.3%. At
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this stage, two observations are worth making. First, although ex-post (that is at the age of
50) the women from the 1891-1895 and 1896-1900 generations achieved the same marriage
rate as the women from other generations, from the perspective of 1914, when they had to
decide whether to get married and have children, the probability of keeping (or replacing) a
husband must have appeared quite dierent to them than to the previous generations at the
same age. Second, the disruption in the marriage market does not imply that births should
be aected. Although it is common, it is not necessary to be married to have children.
Figure 7 shows that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births increased signicantly during
the war. Thus it seems reasonable, as a rst approximation, to study fertility choices while
abstracting from the marriage market.
Little information is available on female labor during the war. There was no exhaustive
census available. Some were planned during the course of the war but ended up being
cancelled. Robert (2005) reports that the best information available is from seven surveys
conducted by work inspectors. These surveys did not cover all branches of the economy
such as railways and state-owned rms. However, data are available for 40,000 to 50,000
establishments in food, chemicals, textile, book production, clothing, leather, wood, build-
ing, metalwork, transport and commerce. These establishments employed about 1.5 million
workers before the war: about a quarter of the labor force in industry and commerce.
Robert (2005, Table 9.1) reports the total number employed and the number of women
employed in the establishments surveyed. Although this is not the participation rate per
se it gives a picture of female labor during the war. The share of women worker was 30%
in July 1914 and peaked in January 1915 at 38.2%. It then declined slowly throughout the
war and during the following years. It was 32% in July 1920. Downs (1995) and Schweitzer
(2002) emphasize that the increase in women's participation during the war is moderated
by the fact that most, that is between 80 and 95%, of the women who worked during the
war also worked in more feminized sectors before the war. Downs (1995, page 48) writes
In the popular imagination, working women had stepped from domestic ob-
scurity to the center of production, and into the most traditionally male of
industries. In truth, the war brought thousands of women from the obscurity
of ill-paid and ill-regulated works as domestic servant, weavers and dressmakers
into the brief limelight of weapons production.
In the model of Section 3 a woman's labor is exogenous which, in light of the evidence just
presented, is a reasonable abstraction.
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3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals living
for I + J periods: I as a child and J as an adult. When an individual becomes adult it
leaves the household in which it was born, and pairs with another adult of the same age
and the opposite sex to form a new household of age 1. The household formation process
is exogenous. Only households make decisions.
There are two sources of uncertainty. At the aggregate level the economy evolves through
periods of war and peace, and at the household level the number of adults is also a random
variable whose probability distribution depends upon the aggregate state of the economy,
i.e., whether it is peace or war. Let !t 2 
 = fwar;peaceg be a random variable describing
whether the economy is in a state of war or peace. At date t the current state !t is realized
before any decisions are made. The households' perception, at date t, of the likelihood of
war or peace at t+ 1 is summarized by the probability distribution qt(!
0):
qt(!
0) = Pr
 f!t+1 = !0g :
Let mj 2 M = f1; 2g denote the number of adult(s) in an age-j household. Assume that
mj is realized at the beginning of the period, before any decisions are made, and that it
is described by a Markov chain with a transition function depending upon whether the
economy is in a state of peace or war:
p!(m
0jm) = Pr  fmj+1 = m0gjfmj = mg ;
and initial condition m1 = 2 since all households are formed with two adults. Assume that
during peacetime the number of adults is constant so that
ppeace(m
0jm) = I(fm0 = mg)
while during a war there is a non-zero probability that a wife remains alone in the next
period:
pwar(1j2) > 0:
The exact value of pwar(1j2) is determined in Section 4.2. Since households are formed
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with two members and remain as such during peacetime there are no one-adult households
when the war breaks out. Assume that p!(1j1) = 1; i.e., a wife does not remarry once
she is alone. One can interpret pwar(1j2) as the probability that a husband dies during the
war and his wife does not remarry. Therefore, the probability pwar(2j2) is either that of a
husband surviving the war or dying but his wife re-marrying.
A household is fecund twice during its life, at age 1 and 2. That is, it chooses how many
children to give birth to only at age 1 and 2, and only if there are two adults. The number
of children born to an age-j (j = 1; 2) household is denoted bj . They remain present until
the household reaches age I + j   1. The stock of children present in an age-j household,
denoted by nj , is
nj = b1If1  j  Ig+ b2If2  j  I + 1g: (1)
A household's preferences are represented by
E
8<:
JX
j=1
j 1 ~U (cj ; nj ;mj)
9=;
where
~U(c; n;m) = U

c
(n;m)

+ V (n;m)
and E is the expectation operator. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount
factor, cj is total household consumption at age j and (n;m) is an adult-equivalent scale.
The parameter  is positive. Assume the following functional form:
U(x) =
x1 
1   and V (n;m) = (n
 +m)1=
with  > 0 and   1.
At this stage a few observations are in order. First, a household values consumption per
(adult equivalent) member and not total consumption. Thus, one of the costs of having
a child is a reduction of consumption per (adult equivalent) member. Note also that the
introduction of the adult-equivalent scale aects the way the marginal cost of a child changes
when the number of adult decreases. To understand this, remember that the marginal utility
of consumption measures the cost of diverting resources away from consumption and into
childrearing. Suppose now that an adult disappears. Then, total consumption decreases
and if a household valued total consumption the marginal cost of a child would increase by
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a magnitude dictated by the slope of U . Since instead a household values consumption per
(adult equivalent) member, this eect is mitigated by the fact that the decrease of total
consumption together with a decrease of the number of adults implies less of a reduction of
the consumption per (adult equivalent) member and, therefore, less of an increase in the
marginal cost of a child. Second, children of the same age (born in the same period) and of
dierent age (born in dierent periods) are perfect substitutes in utility. This assumption
is made for simplicity. Third, the parameter  controls the marginal utility of a child when
the number of adult is constant, as I assume it is in the pre-war period. It also controls the
substitutability between children and adults when the number of adults becomes variable,
as I assume it is in war times. Fourth, the number of adults acts as a preference shock
through two channels: (i) a decrease of the number of adults directly aects utility and,
in particular, it reduces the marginal utility of children through V ; (ii) a decrease of the
number of adults implies an increase in consumption per (adult equivalent) member, holding
everything else constant. Beside the eect of m on preferences, a decrease of the number
of adults also acts as an income shock as will transpire in the description of a household's
income.
Adults are endowed with one unit of productive time per period. A husband supplies
his time inelastically while a wife allocates hers between raising children and working. A
child requires  units of a wife's time and e units of the consumption good for each period
during which it is present in the household. The parameter  represents the state of the
\childrearing" technology and, therefore, is not a control variable. Thus, a wife's time
allocation is indirectly controlled through the number of children she gives birth to. The
wage rate for a husband is denoted by wmt and is assumed to grow at the constant (gross)
rate g > 1 per period: wmt+1 = gw
m
t : Similarly, the wage rate for a wife is denoted w
f
t and
is assumed to grow at rate g too. It is convenient to dene the function
Lt(m;!) =
(
wft + w
m
t (1  !) when m = 2
wft when m = 1
as the \potential" labor income of a household, i.e., the labor income it would receive if no
time was devoted to raising children. Note that when there is one adult in the household
it is assumed to be the wife. When there are two adults but there is a war the husband's
income is reduced by a fraction war 2 (0; 1). Thus, 1   war measures the compensation
received from the government during a war, when the husband is mobilized and cannot
perform his regular job. In the case where war = 1 there is no compensation and the
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husband's income is totally lost to the household. If war = 0 the husband's income loss is
totally compensated. Let peace = 0. A household has access to a one-period, risk-free bond
with (gross) rate of interest 1=. It can freely borrow and lend any amount at this rate. It
owns no assets at the beginning of age 1.
3.2 Optimization
At date t an age-1 household is made of 2 adults. It has no assets and no children. It
decides to consume (c) save (a0) and how many children to give birth to (b1). Its value
function writes
W1;t(!) = max
c;b1;a0
~U(c; b1; 2) + 
X
m02M
X
!02

W2;t+1
 
a0; b1;m0; !0

p!(m
0j2)qt(!0) (2)
subject to
c+ a0 + b1

e+ wft

= Lt(2; !) (3)
The only relevant state variable for a household, beside time, is the aggregate state of the
economy, !.11 The right-hand side of the budget constraint (3) shows the \potential" labor
income of a household. The time cost of raising b1 children appears as an expenditure
on the left-hand side: wft b1. Thus, the eective labor income is Lt(2; !)   b1wft . The
function W2;t+1 (a
0; b1;m0; !0) is the value function of a household of age 2 with a0 assets
accumulated, b1 children born at age 1, m
0 surviving adults, and facing the aggregate state
!0. Note that at age 1 the number of children born and the number of children present in
the household are the same since n1 = b1, as per Equation (1). Note, nally, that b1 is a
relevant state variable for an age 2 household whenever I  2, as assumed.
An age-2 household at date t learns its number of adults, m, and the aggregate state of the
economy, !, and decides to consume (c) save (a0) and how many children to give birth to
(b2). Its optimization problem writes
W2;t (a; b1;m; !) = max
c;b2;a0
~U(c; b1 + b2;m)
+ 
X
m02M
X
!02

W3;t+1
 
a0; b1; b2;m0; !0

p!(m
0jm)qt(!0) (4)
11Since wages are deterministic, time is the only state variable needed to know the current and future
wages.
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subject to
c+ a0 + (b1 + b2)

e+ wft

= Lt(m;!) +
a

(5)
and b2 = 0 whenever m = 1. The right-hand side of the budget constraint represents total
income: the sum of \potential" labor income as well as income from assets accumulated dur-
ing the previous period. The time cost of raising the children present in the household at age
2 appears as an expenditure on the left-hand side. As per Equation (1) the number of chil-
dren present in the household at age 2 is n2 = b1+ b2. The function W3;t+1 (a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)
is the value function of an age 3 household at date t + 1 with a0 assets accumulated, m0
adults, b1 children born at age 1, b2 children born at age 2 and facing the state !
0. Note
that, even though there are no births after age 2, the household must keep track of the
number of children born at age 1 and 2 in order to assess the childrearing cost it is facing
each period, as well as to compute its (adult equivalent) size.
From age 3 onward the only choices are consumption (c) and savings (a0). The number of
children, nj , evolves in line with the law of motion described by Equation (1). Formally,
the optimization problem writes
Wj;t (a; b1; b2;m; !) = max
c;a0
~U(c; nj ;m)
+ 
X
m02M
X
!02

Wj+1;t+1
 
a0; b1; b2;m0; !0

p!(m
0jm)qt(!0)
subject to
c+ a0 + nj

e+ wft

= Lt(m;!) +
a

(6)
n : given by Equation (1)
j > 2
and a0 = 0 when j = J .
3.2.1 Optimality Conditions
The rst order conditions for consumption and savings at age 1 imply the Euler equation:
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)
= E1;t

@
@a0
W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)

(7)
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where E1;t is the expectation operator, conditioning on the information available to an age-1
individual at date t, and derived from the probability distributions qt and p! as described in
problem (2). The marginal cost of a reduction in household consumption, measured on the
left-hand side, is the marginal utility of consumption per (adult equivalent) member. The
marginal benet is the expected marginal gain at age 2, measured on the right-hand side
of the equation. The rst order conditions for consumption and fertility can be rearranged
into

@
@b1
V (b1; 2) + E1;t

@
@b1
W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)

=
U 0

c
(b1; 2)

1
(b1; 2)


e+ wft +
c
(b1; 2)
@
@b1
1(b1; 2)

(8)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benet of a child born at age 1, and the right-hand
side is the marginal cost. The marginal benet comprises two parts: the instantaneous
benet at age 1, measured by @V (b1; 2)=@b1, and the expected marginal benet (net of fu-
ture costs) from age 2 onward measured by E1;t [@W2;t+1(a
0; b1;m0; !0)=@b1]. The marginal
cost comprises three elements. The rst two are the resource cost of raising the child, e,
and the time cost, i.e., the loss of a fraction of the wife's labor income, wft . The third
element is the allocation of consumption to the newborn. The new child represents an
increase of @(b1; 2)=@b1 adult-equivalent, thus it receives c=(b1; 2)  @(b1; 2)=@b1 units
of consumption. These three costs, expressed in consumption units, are weighted by the
marginal utility of consumption per (adult equivalent) member, U 0(c=(b1; 2))=(b1; 2).
At age 2 the Euler Equation and optimality condition for fertility are
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)
= E2;t

@
@a0
W3;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

(9)
and

@
@b2
V (b1 + b2;m) + E2;t

@
@b2
W3;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

=
U 0

c
(b1 + b2;m)

1
(b1 + b2;m)


e+ wf +
c
(b1 + b2;m)
@
@b2
(b1 + b2;m)

(10)
which have the same interpretations as Equations (7) and (8). When m = 1 a household
cannot have children, therefore b2 = 0 and Equation (10) does not hold with equality.
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At age 3 and above the only choice faced by a household is that of consumption and savings.
The optimality conditions for consumption and savings are then summarized by the Euler
equation
U 0

c
(nj ;m)

1
(nj ;m)
= Ej;t

@
@a0
Wj+1;t+1(a
0; b1; b2;m0; !0)

:
3.3 Discussion
There are two mechanisms through which the war aects fertility, the second magnifying
the eect of the rst. First, the expected marginal benet of a child (left-hand sides of 8 and
10) decreases during the war. This is because the war implies a reduction of the expected
number of adults and because the marginal utility of a child is increasing in the number
of adults: Vnm > 0. Second, the war implies an increase of the marginal cost of raising a
child. This increase occurs because consumption decreases during the war and, therefore,
its marginal utility increases, i.e. the cost of diverting resources away from consumption and
toward raising a child increases. The decrease in consumption results from (i) the decrease
in expected income due to the probability that the wife remains alone after the war; (ii) the
decrease in contemporaneous income due to the husband's mobilization and loss of labor
productivity; (iii) the increase in savings due to increased risk with respect to m. Note that
the decrease in productivity during the war mitigates the increase in the marginal cost of a
child by lowering the opportunity cost of time.
There are two important points to emphasize at this stage. The rst is that the functions
U and V determine the quantitative eect of the war on fertility and, more precisely, the
parameter  which controls the marginal utility of consumption, and the parameter  which
controls the marginal utility of a child and the substitutability between adults and children.
Second, the war is not just an increase in income risk, but also a shock to expected income.
This is because the dierence between war and peace, in the model, is not a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of m, the number of adults. The war does increase the income
risk of a household, but it also reduces expected income since the expected number of adults
becomes less than 2 once it breaks out.
In Section 4.1 the model's parameters are calibrated to t the time trend of fertility before
the war. It is worth, then, discussing the mechanism through which the model is able to
generate a downward slopping trend in fertility. It is also important to understand why this
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trend is relevant to impose discipline on the parameters that are critical for the eect of the
war:  and . Following the approach in Greenwood et al. (2005), the mechanism leading
to a long-run decline in fertility is an increase in the opportunity cost of raising children
resulting from wage growth. Note that growth in a wife's wage implies both an income and
a substitution eect while growth in a husband's wage only implies an income eect. As is
common in a time allocation problem the nal eect of wage growth on fertility depends
upon preferences and, in particular, the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
utility of a child. For fertility to decline at the same pace in the model and the data, the
income eect resulting from the growth of both wm and wf needs to be more than oset by
the substitution eect resulting from the increase in wf . Thus, the trend in fertility imposes
a limit on the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption can decrease, and the rate
at which the marginal utility of a child can increase, that is the trend imposes discipline on
 and , the parameters that are critical for the eect of the war on fertility. In short, the
time series of fertility is used to restrict size of the income eect on fertility, which depends
on  and , and this discipline is then used to assess the eect of a particular income shock:
the war.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model's parameters to t the time series of the French fertility
rate from 1800 until the eve of World War I. This time series, and in particular the pace
at which it declines through time, is informative to restrict the parameters of the model
{see Section 3.3. Using the calibrated parameters I conduct a set of experiments where I
compute the optimal decisions of the generations reaching their childbearing years during
an unanticipated war and after. In the rst experiment, which I refer to as the \baseline,"
the generations reaching their childbearing years during the war experience three shocks
that their predecessors did not: a higher risk that a wife remains alone in the household
at the beginning of the next period, a partially-compensated loss of a husband's income
during the war, and a permanent drop in labor productivity. This experiment provides a
quantitative assessment of the eect of the war on optimal fertility. I also conduct coun-
terfactual experiments to decompose the contribution of the shocks. First, I report the
optimal fertility implied by the model when abstracting from the income loss during the
war while maintaining the increased risk that a wife remains alone as well as the loss of
labor productivity. Second I report the results of an exercise where both the income loss
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during the war, and the reduction in labor productivity are as in the baseline, but the risk
that a wife remains alone is nil. Finally, I compute the optimal fertility that would prevail
had there been no loss of labor productivity. Finally, I also discuss the sensitivity of the
baseline results with respect to the choice of some parameters.
4.1 Calibration
A model period is 5 years. Thus, an individual of age 1 in the model can be interpreted as
a child between the age of 0 and 5 in the data. Let I = 4 and J = 7 so that an individual
remains in the household in which it was born until it reaches the age of 15-20, and a
young household is composed of two individuals between the age of 20 and 25. Households
in the model have their children during the rst and second period of their adult lives,
which correspond to their 20s in the data. Life ends between the age of 50 and 55. An
optimal path of fertility is a vector of 26 observations corresponding the the calendar years
1806; 1811; : : : ; 1931:
Let the rate of interest on the risk free asset be 4% per year. This implies a subjective
discount factor  = 1:04 5. I assume that wm and wf grow at the same, constant (gross)
rate g from some initial conditions. I use the rate of growth of the Gross National Product
per capita in the 19th century, 1:6% per year, to calibrate g {see Carre et al. (1976, Tables
1.1 and 2.3). Thus, g = 1:0165. I normalize the initial condition (corresponding to 1806 in
the data) for wm to 1 and I assume a constant gender gap in wages wf=wm. Huber (1931,
pp. 932-935) reports gures for the daily wages for men and women in agriculture, industry
and commerce in 1913. In industry, a woman's wage in 1913 was 52% of a man's. In
agriculture the gap was 64%, and in commerce it was 77%. Since commerce was noticeably
smaller than agriculture and industry I use wf=wm = 0:6. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity
results with respect to wf=wm. Note that a gender gap in earnings of 60% is consistent
with the ndings of the more recent literature studying the United States. Blau and Kahn
(2006, Figure 2.1) report that women working full-time earned between 55% and 65% of
what men earned from the 1950s to the 1980s. Knowles (2010) reports that, throughout
the 1960s, the ratio of mean wages of women to those of men was slightly below 60% in the
U.S.
For , the adult-equivalent scale, I use the \OECD-modied equivalence scale" which assigns
a value of 1 to the rst adult member in a household, 0.5 to the second adult and 0.3 to
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each child:
(n;m) =
1
2
+
m
2
+ 0:3n:
There are four remaining parameters: , , , and  . I calibrate them to minimize a distance
between the model's predicted time series of fertility and the actual time series in France
before the war. In the model the war breaks out in 1916. Since the 1911 generation gives
birth to children in 1911 and 1916 it is only aected by the war, which I assume to be
unanticipated, in 1916. Thus, for this procedure I use data up to and including the fertility
rate in 1911 and I assume that there are no wars and that individuals do not anticipate
any:
!t = peace and qt(peace) = 1 for t = 1806; 1811; : : : ; 1911:
Formally, let  = (; ; ; )0 be the vector of remaining parameters. I chose them to solve
the following minimization problem:
min

X
t2I
(ft()  ft)2 + (  n1911()  0:1)2 (11)
where I is an index set: I = f1806; 1811; 1816; : : : ; 1911g. This objective function deserves
a few comments. First, ft() is the fertility rate implied by the model for a given value of
. Since women in households of age 1 and 2 give births at each date, ft() is the sum
of births from these two generations at date t, divided by 2. Second, ft is the empirical
counterpart of ft().
12 Third, n1906() is the total number of children born to the 1906
generation. Thus, the second part of the objective function is the distance between the
time spent by this generation raising its children and its empirical counterpart, 10%. The
latter gure comes from Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II). They report that in the 1960s
a woman in the U.S. spends close to 6 hours per week on various aspect of childcare, that
is primary, educational and recreational. This amounts to 10% of the sum of market work,
non-market work and childcare (61 hours). Thus,  is set to imply that the time spent by a
women on childcare, on the eve of the war, is 10% as well. The good cost of raising a child
is assumed to be zero, i.e., e = 0. Note that if e was proportional to wf that is, if the good
cost of raising a child was growing at rate g, then setting e to 0 would be innocuous since
e could be subsumed into  . In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the
target gure for the time cost of raising a child.
12I construct a time series of the French fertility rate using the birth rate and the proportion of women
between the age of 15 and 44 from Mitchell (1998).
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Although , ,  and  are determined simultaneously, some aspects of the data are more
important than others for some parameters. The level of fertility, in particular, is critical to
discipline the parameter  which measures the intensity of a household's taste for children.
The time cost of a child, that is 10% of a woman's time, is critical in determining the value
of  . The parameter  determines the curvature of the marginal utility of consumption
and, since the number of adults in a household in constant, the parameter  determines the
curvature of the marginal utility of fertility. Thus the decline in fertility which results from a
comparison between its marginal cost (partly driven by the marginal utility of consumption)
and its marginal benet, disciplines the parameters  and . As discussed in Section 3.3,
the discipline imposed by the time series of fertility on these parameters is relevant to assess
the eect of the war on fertility. The calibrated parameters are displayed in Table 2. Figure
8 displays the computed and actual fertility rate for the pre-war period.
4.2 Baseline Experiment
In the experiment I assume that the war breaks out in 1916 and that it lasts for one period:
!1916 = war and !t = peace for t > 1916:
I use three dierent values for q1916(war), i.e., the perceived likelihood that the war will lasts
one more period: 0, 10 and 20%. I use these values to evaluate the quantitative importance
of this parameter which is dicult to discipline empirically.13
I calibrate pwar(1j2), the probability that a wife is alone in the next period as
pwar(1j2) = military losses of World War I
total men mobilized
:
The military losses where 1:4 millions while 8:5 million men were mobilized. Thus, I use
pwar(1j2) = 1:4=8:5 = 0:16. This gure is not perfect. On the one hand it might exaggerate
the risk from the perspective of a wife since she has the possibility of remarrying after the
war if her husband died. This possibility would allow a wife to raise her children with hers
and another husband's income. On the other hand the probability may underestimate the
risk since the husband may survive the war but come home disabled. In the case of World
13The literature on disasters, such as Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008), emphasizes the importance
of the probability of a disaster occurring, while q1916(war) is the probability that the war goes on for one
more period conditional on being ongoing already.
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War I this was a distinct possibility since the massive use of artillery and gases made this
conict quite dierent from any other conict before. Huber (1931, p. 448) reports 4.2
million wounded during the war: half of the men mobilized. The number of invalid was 1.1
million among which 130,000 were mutilated and 60,000 were amputated. In Section 4.4 I
present sensitivity results with respect to pwar(1j2) to address these concerns. Note that I
assume that all men in their childbearing years are mobilized. This is because the size of
the mobilization was massive: 8.5 out of 8.7 million men between the age of 20 and 50 were
mobilized.
Households did not get fully compensated for the income loss they incurred while the men
were mobilized. Downs (1995) cites a compensation amounting to somewhere between 35
and 60% of a man's pre-war salary in agriculture or industry.14 To represent this loss, I set
war = 0:5. In Section 4.4 I present sensitivity results with respect to the magnitude of the
income loss of the husband.
There is evidence that macroeconomic aggregates fell during the First World War. Using
data from the French national accounts, I compute a time series of real output per worker
and found that it is 28% lower in 1919 than in 1913.15 Figure 11 shows an index of this
time series. Note that this gure is consistent with Barro (2006, Table 1)'s reporting of
a drop of 31% in real Gross Domestic Product per capita in France (29% in Germany). I
model this shock as permanent. That is, I impose that in 1916 wages drop by a fraction 
below their trend:
wm1916 = (1  )gwm1911 and wf1916 = (1  )gwf1911
and that from this date onward they grow a the constant rate g. I use  = 0:3.
The results of this experiment are reported in Figure 9 and Table 3 for three values of
q1916(war): 0, 10% and 20%. Consider the case where q1916(war) = 0, that is when house-
holds anticipate that the war lasts for one period only. The fertility rate predicted by the
model falls by 54% in 1916 relative to 1911, versus 49% in the data. Thus, the model
over-predicts the decline in fertility by 10% (54=49 = 1:10). After the war fertility increases
by 154% in the model versus 118% in the data. Thus the model over-predicts the post-war
increase by 31% (154=118 = 1:31). Figure 10 helps interpreting these results. It shows
14See Downs (1995, p. 49) and Huber (1931, pp. 932-935).
15The data is from CEPII. It is available upon request or at can be downloaded at:
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/serlongues/crois.xls
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fertility by age at dierent point in time, as predicted by the model. Observe that during
the war households of age 1 and 2 reduce their fertility since they are both aected by the
shocks associated with the war. After the war fertility rises for households of age 1 and 2.
There are two points deserving a discussion at this stage. First, since the war is over in
1921, age 1 and 2 households at this time have fertility decisions that are consistent with
the trend in wages. Since the shock to wages is permanent, however, their fertility reaches
higher trends than before the war. Second, the fertility of age 2 households in 1921, that
is the 1916 generation who was of age 1 during the war, rises above trend. This is because
this generation postponed giving birth during the war and is catching up after. A fact
consistent with the pattern observed in the data of gure 6. This catch-up eect does not
compensate for the decit of births during the war, though. Thus, the model predicts that
the completed fertility of the 1916 generation is 25% below trend. A fact that is consistent
with the completed fertility data of Figure 3.
Turning to the cases where households expect that the war might last longer than one
period, that is when q1916(war) = 10% and 20%, Table 3 reveals that both the decline of
fertility during the war, and the subsequent increase are exacerbated in comparison with the
case where households anticipate the war to last only one period. When q1916(war) = 10%,
fertility decreases by 55% vis-a-vis 49 in the data, therefore exceeding the actual decline
by 12%. When households perceive that the war has a 20% probability of still being on
in the next period, the fertility decline is 56%. In these cases the increases in fertility
between 1916 and 1921 are 162 and 169%, respectively (v. 118% in the data). It should
be noted that there are two eects of an increase in q1916(war) that are osetting each
other. On the one hand, an increase in q1916(war) magnies the risk associated with the
war and, therefore, exacerbates the fertility adjustment caused by it. On the other hand,
when a young household expects the war to be over in the next period it has an incentive to
reallocate births into the future. This incentive is weakened by increases in the probability
that, in the future, the war can still be on. The results displayed in Table 3 show that this
mechanism is dominated by the rst one.
As transpires from the previous discussion, the assumption that the decline in wages during
the war is permanent is not innocuous. To assess its importance I conduct an experiment
where I assume that the decline in wages during the war is temporary. That is, I assume
wm1916 = (1  )gwm1911 and wf1916 = (1  )gwf1911 as above, but I also assume that wm1921 =
g2wm1911 and w
f
1921 = g
2wf1911. I nd that in such case the decline in fertility during the
war is 54% as in the baseline and that the increase after the war is 139% (v. 154 in the
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baseline). With a temporary drop in wages, the opportunity cost of raising chidden after
the war is higher than in the baseline, thus the catch-up of fertility is less pronounced.
This exercise shows that the combination of three shocks, the increase probability that a
wife remains alone after the war, the husband's inability to earn income during the war, and
the decrease in labor productivity imply large changes in optimal fertility, over-predicting
both the decrease observed during the war and the catch-up observed after. Note again
that although, in the model, husbands are unable to receive income during the war, there
are no physical separations of couples.
4.3 Decomposition
To evaluate the relative contributions of the shocks faced by households exposed to the war
during their fertile years I conduct three counterfactual experiments. Remember that in
the baseline the three shocks representing the war are (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0:5; 0:16; 0:3).
In each counterfactual experiment I abstract from one of these shocks while leaving the
two others achieve their baseline value. So, in the rst experiment I abstract from the
contemporaneous loss of income: (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0; 0:16; 0:3). In the second I ab-
stract from the risk that a wife is alone after the war: (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0:5; 0; 0:3).
In the last experiment, I abstract from the permanent decrease in labor productivity:
(war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0:5; 0:16; 0)
Figure 12 and Table 3 show the results of these experiments for dierent values of q1916(war).
In Experiment 1, that is when households are faced with the same risk of loosing their hus-
bands as in the baseline and the same decline in labor productivity, but no contemporaneous
income loss, i.e. (war; pwar(1j2); ) = (0; 0:16; 0:3), and when q1916(war) = 0, the decrease of
fertility between 1911 and 1916 is 44% versus 54 in the baseline case. The post-war increase
is 111% (v. 154 in the baseline). Although, these gures vary as q1916(war) changes, they
remain proportional to the changes generated by the baseline experiment. As Table 3 shows,
the decline in fertility in this experiment represents 80-81% of the decline generated by the
baseline, regardless of the value of q1916(war). The increase in fertility in this experiment
amounts to 70-72% of the increase generated by the baseline experiment, regardless of the
value of q1916(war). This result suggests that the bulk of the fertility changes caused by the
war can be attributed to the increased risk that wives would remain alone after the war,
and that this conclusion is robust to how likely households perceived that the war would
keep going.
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When abstracting from the loss of expected income due to the risk that a wife remains
alone after the war (Experiment 2), and when q1916(war) = 0, the fertility decline generated
by the model amounts to 9% of the decline generated in the baseline, and the post-war
increase 6%. As with the rst experiment, these results are fairly robust to the value used
for q1916(war): It is not surprising that the risk that a wife remains alone plays a larger role
than the contemporaneous income loss for a household. The latter is a temporary shock
while the former is a permanent income shock. But, in addition to being an income shock,
a reduction of the number of adults is also a preference shock, as discussed in Section 3.1,
which also reduces the expected marginal benet for a child.
The gures of Experiment 2 can be used to evaluate the decline in fertility that would have
occurred if households anticipated to replace deceased husbands for sure. Such calculation
is relevant because, as noted in Section 2.3, the women whose fertility was aected by the
war eventually married as the women of any other generations. Experiment 2 shows that
if these women perceived no risk of raising their children alone, then their fertility would
have decreased by 5=49 = 10% of the actual decline observed in the French data when
q1916(war) = 0. This gure increases to 12 and 14% when q1916(war) increases to 10 and
20%, respectively.
Experiment 3 shows how optimal fertility would have declined in the absence of the drop
of labor productivity during the war. The result is that fertility would have declined more
than in the baseline: 57% (v. 54 in the baseline) when q1916(war) = 0. Thus the decline in
labor productivity mitigates the eect of the war on fertility. This results follows from the
discipline imposed by the calibration of Section 4.1 on the relative strength of income and
substitution eects when wages are changing. In particular, when both wages are growing
at the same rate the substitution eect dominates to yield the downward slopping trend
in fertility. During the war, where the experiment consists in a proportional reduction
of both wm and wf , the substitution eect dominates too, but in the opposite direction:
the reduction of labor productivity reduces the opportunity costs of having a child and,
therefore, mitigates the decline in fertility implied by the war.
4.4 Sensitivity
I consider alternative values for (i) the probability that a woman remains alone after the
war, pwar(1j2); (ii) the magnitude of the husband's income loss during the war, war; (iii)
the time cost of raising children,  ; and (iv) the gender wage gap in earnings, wf=wm.
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Consider two alternative values for pwar(1j2), the probability that a woman remains alone
after the war: 10 and 20% instead of 16 in the baseline. In both cases the baseline experiment
of Section 4.2 is performed with the new value of pwar(1j2), while assuming that q1916(war) =
0, that is households expect the war to last for one period only. Table 4 reports the results.
It transpires that this probability matters noticeably for the results of the exercise but that,
even in the conservative case where the risk for a wife to remain alone is 10%, the model
generates a strong decline in fertility: 41% versus 54 in the baseline and 49 in the data.
In the experiment of Section 4.2 a household loses 50% of a husband's income because of
mobilization. I consider two alternative values: one where the loss of income is 25% and
one where it is 75%. Performing the same experiment as in Section 4.2 with these values
implies results that are reported in Table 4. As the income loss gets smaller, the model
generates smaller decline in fertility and, consequently smaller increase after the war. In
the case of an income loss of 25% during the war, the model still implies a strong decline
in fertility: 49%.
Consider now alternative targets for the time cost of raising children. For each new target
the model needs to be calibrated again in exactly the same fashion as in Section 4.1 with
the exception of the target in the second component of the objective function (11). Then
the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. I consider two alternative targets: a time cost of
5% and a time cost of 20%. The results are displayed in Table 4. The model's prediction for
the change in fertility is not monotonic in the time cost of a child. It may appear \counter-
intuitive" that the eect of the war on fertility is not exacerbated when the cost of a child
is larger than in the baseline, e.g., when it is 20%. The reason for this result is that, as the
target gure for the time cost of a child changes, other parameters change too. In particular,
a larger-than-baseline time cost of raising a child implies, through the calibration procedure,
a higher value for : This can be understood as follows: as the opportunity cost of raising
a child increases the marginal cost increases too. Since the model is calibrated to t the
fertility data, marginal cost and marginal benet must be equalized at the same fertility
level. This implies that the marginal benet of a child must also increase, which is achieve
through higher values for  and . Higher values for , however, imply less complementarity
between adults and children in utility. This, in turn, makes the war less costly.
Finally, In Table 4 I report the results of an exercise where I consider alternative values for
wm=wf , the gender earning gap: 40 and 80%. As for the sensitivity analysis with respect
to  , the model's parameters are calibrated again for each alternative value of wm=wf and
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the experiment of Section 4.2 is performed. The model generates large variations in fertility
in these experiments.
5 The Quality-Quantity Tradeo
In the model described and used above the long-run decline in fertility results from an
increase in the opportunity cost of raising children when wages are growing. In this section
I show that the analysis carries over to a dierent framework, often found in the literature,
where parents value both the quality and quantity of their children. A simple setup, inspired
from Jones et al. (2008), is enough to show this.
Consider a household composed of a husband and a wife. Each is endowed with one unit
of productive time per period. Let wm and wf represent their wage rates, and let g > 1 be
their common (gross) rate of growth. Let  denote the ratio wm=wf . The household is alive
for two periods but can give birth to children only during the rst period. There are two
types of costs associated with children. First they must be produced, which requires that
 units of a wife's time be spent at home for each child. As in Section 3 the parameter 
is not a choice, but rather a description of the household technology. Second children must
be educated. This implies another cost over which the household has a choice: the quality
of the education. Let e be the resources, measured in goods, invested by the household in
a child's education, then the average quality of a child is
q = Q(e): (12)
Let the household's preferences be represented by
U(c; b; q; c0) =  ln(c) +  ln(b) +  ln(q) + E[ ln(c0)] (13)
where ; ;  > 0 and c and c0 represent current and future consumption, respectively. The
variable b is the number of children and the variable q the average quality of children. The
operator E is the expectation operator. The household has access to a one-period, risk-free
bond with (gross) rate of interest 1=. It can freely borrow and lend any amount at this
rate. It owns no assets at the beginning of the rst period.
During the rst period there are two adults in the households. Thus, the budget constraint
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is
c+ b

e+ wf

+ a0 = wm + wf ; (14)
where a0 represent savings. In the second period the number of adults is a random variable.
If there is only one adult it is the wife, and the probability of that event is denoted by p!
where ! 2 
 = fwar; peaceg: Thus, consumption during the second period is
c0 =
(
a0= + g(wm + wf ) with probability 1  p!
a0= + gwf with probability p!
(15)
The optimization problem of the household is to choose its consumption c, savings a0,
number of children b and investment in children's quality e, in order to maximize its objective
(13) subject to the technology (12) and the budget constraints (14) and (15). The rst order
conditions for this problem are
c : 0 = =c  
a0 : 0 = E[=c0]  
b : 0 = =b  

e+ wf

e : 0 = Q0(e)=Q(e)  b
The solution of this system of equations can be characterized as
c = c(w
m + wf )
a0 = a(wm + wf )
b

e+ wf

= (1  c   a)(wm + wf )
where c and a are constants that depend upon the parameters of the model. (See the
Appendix for a characterization of these constants).
An important dierence between this model and that of Section 3 transpires through these
equations. In the absence of the education margin, that is when e is exogenously set to zero,
the model predicts that fertility is independent of the level of wages during peace times:
b

e=0
=
1  c   a

(1 + ) :
This property is a standard consequence of logarithmic utility and the motivation for using
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it in the specication of preferences in (13). Hence, if this model delivers the decreasing
relationship between fertility and wages during peace times it is because the education
margin is relevant for the choice of b.
Using the functional form for Q(e) proposed by Jones et al. (2008), i.e. Q(e) = 0 + 1e;
and combining the rst order condition for b and e yields
e =
wf=   0=1
1  = (16)
and using the rst order condition for b yields
b =
   

 c
wf
 1
   0=1
wf
: (17)
There are a few points worth commenting at this stage. Assume that   > 0 and consider
peace times, that is when both wf and wm grow at the same rate. Then the rate of fertility
is decreasing as per Equation (17). This transpires since the ratio c=wf is constant. Note
also that Equation (16) implies that, at the same time, the average quality of a child is
increasing. Thus, households are tradding o the quantity for the quality of their children.
Consider now the eect of a war. As in the model of Section 3 the war is a combination of
various shocks. First, there is a shock to the expected number of adults in the future, i.e.
an increase in p!. As per Equation (15), this reduces expected consumption in the second
period and, therefore, raises the expected marginal utility of consumption. The Euler
Equation, derived from the rst order conditions for consumption and savings, implies that
1
c
= E

1
c0

thus, consumption c decreases when the war breaks out. Equation (17) shows, then, that
fertility decreases at the outset of the war.16 Note that this mechanism is the same as in
the model of Section 3: when the war breaks out the loss of expected income induces the
household to reduce its current consumption, thereby raising the cost of diverting resources
away from consumption and into child rearing. Observe that the average quality of children
is not aected by changes in p!. This is a result of the simplifying assumption that only
current resources are invested into a child's education. Second, the war also implies a
16This is not a contradiction to the fact that the ratio c=wf is constant in peace times. The ratio depends
upon the parameters of the model, such as p!. Thus, it is constant in peace times because p! is constant.
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loss of current income because the husband is mobilized. Since current consumption is
proportional to total income in the rst period, this yields a further decline in current
consumption, magnifying the eect discussed above. Third, the war also entails a decline
in labor productivity. As in the model of Section 3, this mechanism works in the opposite
direction, inducing a household to increase its fertility.
This discussion showed that a model of fertility choices embodying the quality-quantity
tradeo can be used to carry out the same analysis as in Sections 1-4. Such a model has the
potential to generate a decline in fertility during periods of peace, and a collapse of fertility
associated with the loss of a husband's income (contemporaneous and/or expected) during
the war.
6 Conclusion
The human losses of World War I were not only on the battleeld. In France, the number
of children not born during the war was as large as military casualties (larger in the case
of Germany). The age structure of population in France and other European countries
was signicantly changed by this event, and the eect lasted for the rest of the Twentieth
century. In this paper I argue that this phenomenon is more than accounted for by the
optimal decisions of households facing three shocks: an increased risk that women remain
alone after the war, a loss of income during the war due to the mobilization of men, and
a reduction in labor productivity. These shocks imply that young adults during the war
see their contemporaneous and expected income decline. As a result they save more and
consume less which increases their cost of having children. The resulting drop in fertility is
10% larger than the actual decline. The model is also able to generate the strong catch-up
of fertility after the war, mostly because of the inter temporal reallocation of births done
by the young generations during the war. The physical separation of couples which is often
cited to explain the fertility decline during the war may have been a factor of secondary
importance. This nding is consistent with a general pattern exhibited by fertility, across
countries and over time, i.e., it tends to decline during periods of signicant unrest even
though there may be no physical separations of couples.
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A The Quality-Quantity Model
Consider the model described in Section 5. Guess that the solution is of the form
c = c(w
m + wf )
a0 = a(wm + wf )
b
 
e+ wf

= (1  c   a)(wm + wf )
Then rst order conditions with respect to c and b imply


c = (1  c   a): (18)
The rst order conditions for consumption and savings yield the Euler equation which can be written
as
1  p!
a0= + g(wm + wf )
+
p!
a0= + gwf
=
1
c
:
Using the guessed solution of c and a0 imply
1  p!
a= + g
+
p!
a= + g=(1 + )
=
1
c
: (19)
Equations (18) and (19) form a system of two equations in c and a, and characterize the solution
of the model.
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Table 1: Changes in Fertility for Countries Experiencing Major Social Upheavals
Country Episode Period Change in CBR (%)
England Civil War, Commonwealth,
and early Restoration 1641-66  17:3
France Revolution 1787-1804  22:5
USA Civil War 1860-70  12:8
Russia WWI and Revolution 1913-21  24:4
Germany War, revolution, defeat, ination 1913-1924  26:1
Austria War, defeat, empire dismembered 1913-24  26:9
Spain Civil war and dictatorship 1935-42  21:4
Germany War, defeat, occupation 1938-50  17:3
Japan War, defeat, occupation 1940-55  34:0
Chile Military coup and dictatorship 1972-78  22:3
Portugal Revolution 1973-85  33:3
Spain Dictatorship to democracy 1976-85  37:2
Eastern Europe Communism to capitalism 1986-98
Russia  56:0
Poland  40:0
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)  38:0
Source: Caldwell (2004, Table 1).
Note: CBR stands for Crude Birth Rate. Caldwell reports that when fertility was already experiencing a
declining trend, the reductions observed during the periods of unrest are signicantly more pronounced than
before and after. For example, the Spanish birth rate fell as much during the Civil War (1935-42) than
during the 35 years before.
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Table 2: Calibration
Preferences  = 1:04 5,  = 0:41,  =  0:13,  = 0:86
Wages wm = 1; wf = 0:6 for initial (1806) generation
g = 1:0165
Cost of children  = 1:01, e = 0
Adult equivalent scale (n;m) = 1=2 +m=2 + 0:3n
Demography I = 4, J = 7
Table 3: Main Experiments: Changes in Fertility During and After the War, Model and
French Data, %
q1916(war) =
0% 10% 20%
1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21 1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118  49 +118  49 +118
Baseline  54 +154  55 +162  56 +169
Baseline / Data 1:10 1:31 1:12 1:37 1:14 1:43
Exp. 1 (war = 0)  44 +111  44 +115  45 +119
Exp. 1 / Baseline 0:81 0:72 0:80 0:71 0:80 0:70
Exp. 2 (pwar(1j2) = 0)  5 +9  6 +11  7 +12
Exp. 2 / Baseline 0:09 0:06 0:11 0:07 0:13 0:07
Exp. 3 ( = 0)  57 +149  58 +157  59 +165
Exp. 3 / Baseline 1:06 0:97 1:05 0:97 1:05 0:98
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Changes in Fertility During and After the War when
q1916(war) = 0, Model and French Data, %
1911-16 1916-21
Data  49 +118
Baseline  54 +154
pwar(1j2) = 10%  41 +97
pwar(1j2) = 20%  58 +185
war = 25%  49 +131
war = 75%  59 +183
Time cost of children 5%  46 +111
Time cost of children 20%  52 +145
wf=wm = 0:4  64 +236
wf=wm = 0:8  47 +118
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Figure 1: Birth Rates in Some European Countries
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Figure 2: Number of Births per Month in France and Germany
Note: The source of data is Bunle (1954, Table XI). The linear trends are estimated using the data from
January 1906 until July 1914. The shaded area is from May 1915, that is 9 months after the declaration of
War between France and Germany in August 1914, until August 1919 that is 9 months after the armistice
was signed in November 1918.
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Figure 3: Total Fertility Rate and Completed Fertility in France
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The total fertility rate in a given year measures the average number of children that would be born to
a women if she experienced, throughout her fertile life, the age-specic fertility rate observed that year.
Completed fertility is the average number of children born to a woman of a particular cohort, once she has
reached age 50.
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Figure 4: French Population by Age and Sex, January 1, Selected Years
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Source: Insee, etat civil et recensement de population.
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Figure 5: Population by Age and Sex, Selected Countries, 1950
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Figure 6: Average and Median Age at Birth in France
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Figure 7: Proportion of Out-of-Wedlock Live Births in France
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Figure 8: Fertility Rate in France, Model and Data, 1806{1911
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Note: This gure displays the result of the calibration procedure where the model parameters are chosen to
t the time series of fertility during the pre-war period.
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Figure 9: Fertility Rate in France, Baseline Experiment and Data, 1806{1931, q1916(war) =
0
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Figure 10: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model by Age, Baseline Experiment, 1806{1931,
q1916(war) = 0
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Figure 11: Index of Output per Worker in France, 1896{1935
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Figure 12: Fertility Rate Predicted by the Model, Baseline and Counterfactual Experiments,
1806{1931, q1916(war) = 0
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